Sapp v. Combs: Court Grants Reconsideration on One California Trafficking Claim, Denies It on the Rest

In the matter of Sapp v. Combs et al., No. 1:25-cv-00996 (S.D.N.Y.), United States District Judge Jennifer L. Rochon issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on Nov. 6, 2026, granting in part and denying in part plaintiff Julian Sapp’s motion for partial reconsideration of her Sept. 18, 2026 dismissal of the case (ECF No. 91 at 1). The motion succeeds as to one count, a California human-trafficking claim, and fails as to the rest.

Background

Sapp alleges that defendant Sean “Diddy” Combs subjected him to trafficking, sexual assault and other misconduct during encounters from about 2007 through 2012. The Sept. 18 order dismissed his two federal claims as untimely, then dismissed most state-law counts as time-barred, and dismissed Count I, a New York City claim, without prejudice (ECF No. 91 at 1–2). See the earlier Dispatch.

Sapp moved under Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allow a party to ask a court to revisit a ruling or amend a judgment. He asked the court to vacate its dismissal of the state-law claims, dismiss them without prejudice, and “expressly preserve his ability to pursue certain claims in California or Nevada” (ECF No. 91 at 1). Combs opposed. “Without prejudice” means a claim may be brought again; supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s discretion to hear state-law claims alongside federal ones.

Counts V Through XV: Denied

The court applies a strict standard that requires a party to point to something the court overlooked. Sapp argues the court should have declined to hear claims timely in California or Nevada but untimely under New York’s period. The order states that his “disagreement does not supply a basis for altering the Judgment” (ECF No. 91 at 5).

On whether the judgment could bar Sapp from suing elsewhere, the court addresses the cases Sapp cites, Semtek, Cloverleaf and Rosenthal. It writes that they “illustrate that this Court’s dismissal of Sapp’s claims with prejudice does not necessarily dictate the effect of the Judgment in another forum,” but that neither of the first two cases requires altering a proper dismissal for a later action (ECF No. 91 at 5). Rosenthal, which enforced a reservation already made, “does not require a court to add such a reservation” (ECF No. 91 at 6). The order adds:

The Court leaves those questions for any court in which Sapp might seek to bring another action and expresses no view on whether any such action may proceed. (ECF No. 91 at 6.)

As to Counts VI, VII, IX, XII, XIV and XV, the court states that Sapp’s argument against retaining jurisdiction was “an argument that he failed to raise in opposing the motion to dismiss” (ECF No. 91 at 6).

Count IV: Reconsidered

Count IV is Sapp’s claim under the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act, California Civil Code § 52.5. The Sept. 18 order held it untimely under California law. Sapp points out that California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.16(e), effective Jan. 1, 2026, revives certain adult sexual-assault damages claims, including actions pending on that date, and extends to “any related claims, including, but not limited to, wrongful termination and sexual harassment, arising out of the sexual assault” (ECF No. 91 at 7). The court applied it to other California counts, but not Count IV: “The Order did not, however, resolve that issue before concluding that California law barred Count IV” (ECF No. 91 at 7).

Combs objected that the revival argument came late and would not save Count IV. The court states that “[t]hose points carry weight,” but that its omission “affects the premise on which the Court retained supplemental jurisdiction over that count” (ECF No. 91 at 8).

The court identifies unbriefed questions, including how the “related claims” language applies to a trafficking claim, which New York limitations period is the counterpart under New York’s borrowing statute, CPLR 202, and whether New York’s civil trafficking statute, enacted after the alleged conduct, applies (ECF No. 91 at 8–9). It does not decide them. Weighing the supplemental-jurisdiction factors, it concludes that “comity favors allowing a court with an independent basis for jurisdiction to resolve those unsettled state law issues,” and that “[n]or would it be fair to rest a final adjudication of Count IV on a limitations rationale that did not consider a potentially applicable revival provision” (ECF No. 91 at 9).

The Order

The court vacates the Count IV portion of the Sept. 18 order and dismisses that count without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Sept. 18 order otherwise remains in effect. The Clerk is directed to amend the Judgment at Dkt. 79 accordingly. The order states: “This case shall remain CLOSED” (ECF No. 91 at 10).

What’s Next

The order sets no further deadlines. On Oct. 20, the court denied Sher Tremonte LLP’s motion to withdraw as Combs’s counsel “with leave to renew via letter motion after the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s pending motion for reconsideration” (ECF No. 90 at 1; earlier Dispatch).

Counsel and Sources

Counsel: Lisa Bloom, Arick Fudali, Yasmine Meyer, Alan Goldstein and Devin Meepos, The Bloom Firm, for Plaintiff Julian Sapp. Erica A. Wolff, Sher Tremonte, for Defendant Sean Combs. Sources: ECF No. 91, on the No. 1:25-cv-00996 docket.

Diddy Docket reports on public court records. Parties are presumed innocent or not liable unless proven otherwise. This is not legal advice.